Funky Buttloving! The AL Rookie of the Year Award

Baseball's Award Week is upon us.  Tomorrow, the Baseball Writers Association of America (BBWAA) will announce the AL and NL Rookie of the Year awards.  Both awards look to be pretty competitive this year with at least two front running candidates expected to get the majority of votes in both leagues.  Since awards won't be announced until tomorrow at 2:00 p.m., I'll make my predictions as to who will win each award.

American League

Runner-up:  Austin Jackson

Let me start out by saying that Austin Jackson did something pretty amazing this season.  He somehow found a way to maintain a near .300 batting average despite striking out 27.5% of the time.  He was able to prop up his batting average due to a .396 BABIP and 24.2% line drive rate.  Are those rates unsustainable?  Sure.  If his strikeout rate remains around the 27.5% level, should we expect his batting average to remain near .300?  Of course not.   He's a pretty clear candidate for regression to the mean, but that doesn't make what he did anymore amazing.  Jackson is an above average defensive center fielder with good speed.  If he can maintain a line drive rate around 20%, he should be able to consistently accumulate 40 doubles and 15 home runs as he gets used to the league.  I do have concerns about his walk rate, but he's only 23.  For his age, a 7.2% walk rate is hardly a concern.   

Winner:  Neftali Feliz

Where Austin Jackson was good, Neftali Feliz was better.  Yes, Jackson put up a better WAR (3.8 to 1.7).  Yes, Jackson played every day at a physically demanding position, while Feliz only pitched an inning every  other game or so.  I agree, but there were few pitchers in baseball that were as dominant as Feliz.  This season, Feliz put up the following numbers:  9.22 K/9, 3.94 K/BB, 2.96 FIP, 11.9% whiff rate, and 0.88 WHIP.  When the Rangers needed a reliever to shut down a rally, they had one.  That's why it was so frustrating for me to watch Ron Washington turn to inferior relievers in the most crucial of situations.  In 2010, Feliz was one of the two or three best closers in baseball.  His stuff is electric.  His control is outstanding.  Feliz is about as good as they come.


Update (11/15/2010):  Neftali Feliz won the award. 

More on the World Series, Ron Washington Blunders

 

What has gotten into the Giants?  No, seriously.  What has gotten into them?  Offensively, they’ve exploded for twenty runs in two games.  All of this coming from a team that finished ninth in the NL in scoring with 697 runs scored.  Coming into the series, everyone knew that the Giants had the slight edge in pitching, (with the exception of Texas’s Cliff Lee), and that the Rangers had a huge edge in hitting.  What we didn’t know was that the Rangers bats would fall silent, and the Giants would wake up after nearly a season long slumber. 

Through six and a half innings last night, we had a tremendous pitching duel.  Matt Cain was inducing lazy fly balls, while C.J. Wilson kept Giant batters off balance by mixing up his array of pitches.  Then, with the Giants up 1-0, Wilson was forced out of the game after 101 pitches and one batter faced in the seventh, due to a blister on his pitching hand.  Darren Oliver came on in relief, and pitched fairly well giving up one hit and an inherited runner. 

After a quick eighth inning for the Giants (Cain was removed with two outs and replaced by Javier Lopez), the Rangers trotted back out to the field with righty Darren O’Day on the mound.  O’Day gave up one hit (a single to Buster Posey) and struck out two, before giving way to lefty Derek Holland.  Washington’s choice of Holland could be best described as perplexing because he was brought in to fact two right handed batters, Burrell (who was immediately replaced by the left-handed Nate Schierholtz) and Cody Ross.  Perhaps Washington’s strategy was to get Burrell out of the lineup for the rest of the night.  If so, mission accomplished.  Either way, the strategy backfired.  Holland walked three consecutive batters on 13 pitches before getting pulled.  The Rangers were now down 3-0.  In hopes of turning things around, Washington calls on Mark Lowe to finish off the inning.  This doesn’t work either.  Lowe walks Juan Uribe, which brings in another run.  (Yes, the same Juan Uribe that has a career .300 OBP and 5.6% walk rate.  I can’t make this up.)  The score is now 4-0 Giants.  Then, with the bases still loaded, Lowe gives up a single to Edgar Renteria, which goes just past the statuesque Mike Young.  Two runs score, Giants up 6-0.  Washington’s had enough, and makes another call to the bullpen.  This time he calls for Michael Kirkman.   Does Kirkman stop the bleeding?  Well, eventually, but not before giving up a triple to Andre Torres and a double to Freddie Sanchez.  When the inning is finally over, the Rangers are behind 9-0, which ended up being the final score.

Now, if you’re like me, you have this sneaking suspicion that something isn’t quite right.  I can’t quite put my finger on it…  Oh wait.  Yes I can!  Rob Neyer, take it away:

“It's 2-0 in the eighth inning of the second game of the World Series. You've already lost the first game (through no fault of the manager). If you don't win this one, you're in big trouble. You've got tomorrow off. Your best pitcher hasn't pitched in nearly a week, and has pitched only three innings in the last two weeks.

And you never use him. You leave Neftali Feliz rotting away in the bullpen, just as you've left him rotting away through most of October.”

Sound familiar?  Didn’t I say the same thing after Game 1 of the ALCS?  Why is Ron Washington so afraid to use Feliz in non-save situations?  I don’t get it.  Look, I’m not saying Washington should’ve brought him in instead of Derek Holland.  Perhaps bringing in Holland was the right move at the time because it forced the Giants to remove Pat Burrell from the game.  I can accept that.  What I can’t (and won’t) accept is the idea that keeping Holland in the game after he walked Schierholz was the right move.  I also won’t accept that bringing in Mark Lowe and Michael Kirkman after Holland failed were the right moves either.  (Just to note, Feliz didn’t get up once to warm up during the eighth.  Had Kirkman failed to get the final out, potential Game 4 starter Tommy Hunter was apparently next in line to pitch.)  Washington needs to manage his team in a manner that puts his team in the best position to win, and he’s not doing that.  He’s leaving his best relief pitcher to rot in the bullpen, while inferior pitchers are being asked to handle the most crucial situations.  This is unfair not only to Feliz (who I’m sure is dying to pitch), but the whole team. 

Look, I’m not saying the Rangers would’ve won had they put Feliz into the game after Holland walked Schierholtz.  They wouldn’t have.  The Rangers failed to score any runs all game, and I don’t see any reason to believe the outcome would’ve been any different had Feliz come in to get the final out in the eighth.  My argument is that pitching Feliz would’ve put the Rangers in a much better position to win.  (A team down 2-0 has a much greater chance of winning than one down 9-0.)  To win a best of seven series, a manager needs to take advantage of situations that give his team an edge.  Washington has shown time and again this postseason (especially through the first two games of the World Series) that he’s not up to the task. 

UPDATE:  NBC’s Hardball Talk Craig Calcaterra added this hysterical anecdote about Ron Washington’s managing ability:

“I’ll simply add that watching Ron Washington manage the Rangers’ bullpen in the postseason has been like watching Richie Tennebaum against Gandhi at the U.S. Nationals tournament. All I can think is that Washington’s adopted sister married Raleigh St. Clair yesterday, throwing him off his game, leading to all of these unforced errors.”

Save the Rangers...

Last night's Yankees-Rangers game epitomizes why I hate the "save".  First of all, the save is inherently meaningless in today's game.  In most cases, a closer comes into a game at the beginning of the ninth inning with no one out and no one on, up by 1-3 runs.  In cases where a team is up by three runs entering the ninth, a team has a 97% chance of winning the game, regardless of who is pitching.  When up by 2 runs, a team has a 94% chance of winning.  Up by one run?  90%.  So if a team has at least a 90% chance of winning a game when their closer enters the ninth in a save situation, why are teams saving their closers for relatively low leverage situations?  The answer is simple.  Since the late 1980s, the save has become the standard bearer of performance among closers.  Agents use a relief pitcher's ability to rack up saves as a selling point to teams bidding on his services.  Managers use saves as a measure for selecting relief pitchers to All Star teams.  The save has become nothing more than a status symbol--a way to separate the strong from the weak.

Saves are incredibly misleading in another way.  It's a counting stat.  A pitcher's ability to accumulate saves relies on his team's ability to provide him with opportunities.  If a team plays in an  unusually high number of tight games, their closer will have an inordinate number of save chances.  Take Francisco Rodriguez for example.  In 2008, K-Rod broke the single season save record of 57 by saving a seemingly unfathomable 62 games.  At first glance, this seems like quite an achievement.  When you look a little closer, you notice that he saved 62 games in 70 chances!  Not only had no closer ever saved 62 games, but no closer had anywhere close to 70 save chances!  So how did this happen?  As a team, the Angels played in an unusually high number of close games, and their bullpen accumulated 66 total saves (with the other four going to Scott Shields).  K-Rod got lucky.  Contrary to popular belief, K-Rod did not have a career year in 2008.  He actually posted his some of his worst peripherals since 2004.  Luckily for K-Rod, he was able to leverage the general overvaluing of saves to his advantage.  After the 2008 season, he was able to extort a 4 year $48M contract out of the hapless Mets.

Back to last night's game.  Ron Washington single handedly screwed his team last night.  Going into the eighth inning, up 5-1 the Rangers sent CJ Wilson back out to the mound.  He'd pitched seven innings of shutout ball having only given up four hits.  It was absolutely the right move.  Soon after, the game got out of hand.  Wilson gave up a single to Gardner (who made a big time heads up play by sliding into first to beat Wilson to the bag), and a double to Derek Jeter.  Washington removed Wilson to the game, and bring out LOOGY Darren Oliver to pitch to Swisher and Teixeria.  This makes sense as well.  Bring in the LOOGY to pitch to lefty Swisher, and turn Tex over his weaker side.  So far, solid managing.  Well, Swisher walked to load the bases, and then Tex walked in the second run.  The score is now 5-2 with the bases loaded and A-Rod coming the plate.  Seems like an obvious time to bring in Neftali Feliz one of the best relief pitchers in the game, right?  Well, if you are a sane person, yes.  If you're Ron Washington, not so much.  Instead, he brings in Darren O'Day!  When that doesn't work, he brings in Clay Rapada!  When that doesn't work, Derek Holland comes in with the Rangers still up 5-4.  Holland faces four batters, and when the inning finally ends, the score is Yankees 6, Rangers 5.  All of this happens without Feliz even getting up to warm up.  Why?  Because it wasn't the ninth inning!  Ron Washington left his best pitcher to rot in the bullpen because it wasn't a save situation.  He managed his entire game to a statistic, and as a result he gave the Yankees a crucial 1-0 lead in the American League Championship Series.  This is absolutely one of the worst management decisions I've ever seen, but it's not like it isn't commonplace.  Managers through out the major and minor leagues do this all of the time.  They save their best relief pitchers for low leverage situations, while they expect middling middle relievers to take care of the really tough situations.  Someday, some smart GM and field manager will figure out how inefficient bullpens are run, and actually have the balls to do something about it.  Until then, teams will continue to lose games they don't need to because their manager is too afraid to put their best relief pitchers in the highest leverage situations.